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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
ADVERS& PossESSION-LIFE TENANT UND&R .Yom. Dtvisi; HOLDING AGAINST" 
Iti:YAINDERHAN.-Testratrix was seised in fee of certaia tenements, Yt'hich by 
a void will she devised to her husband for life with remainder over. The 
husband entered claiming under the will and held for the statutory period. 
Upon his death the remainderman claimed possession under the will on the 
ground that as the husband also claimed under the will he was estopped from 
setting up its invalidity. Held, title in fee accrued to the husband and his 
heirs by adverse possession ; for the wi11 being void the husband was not 
estopped from denying the title of the remainderman. In re Coale, [1920) 
2 Ch. 536. 
The English cases have-definitely established that a life tenant under a 
void will, who claims under the will for the statutory period gets title by 
adverse possession; and is not stopped from denying the title of the re-
mainderman. Paine v. Jones, (1874), L. R., 18 Eq. 320 ;. In re Coale, supra. 
On the other hand where the testator's title is defective, but whatever in-
terest he does have is conveyed by a valid instrument and thereafter the pos-
session of the life tenant perfects the devisor's title, the benefit of that posses-
sion will enure to those claiming in remainder, for the life tenant is estopped 
from denying the title of the deviser. Bo_ard v. Board, (1873), L. R. 9 Q. 
B., 48; In re Anderson, [I9<>5] 2 Ch. 70. The distinction is that in the latter 
case the life tenant acquire·s possession by force of the devise; an4 having 
accepted a benefit thereunder will not be allowed to say that the common 
testator did not have the title, which in fact was outstanding in another. See 
28 YALE LAW JOURNAL 219. Th.ere are some American courts which do not 
follow this distinction. In Hanson v. Johnson, (1884), 62 Md. 25, the court 
held that a tenant for life claiming under a void will was estopped from 
denying the title of the remainderman. This however was unnecessary "to 
the decision of the case. To the same effect is Anderson v. Rhodus, (I86o, .-
S. C.), 12 Rich. Eq. 104, where the court says that the possession of the life 
tenant was not hostile to the remainderman; but was in assertion and support 
of their common title. The trouble with this is that there is no common title 
when the devise is invalid. "Neither the life tenant nor the remainderman 
receive any title under the will. Whatever title the life tenant gets he ac-
quires by his own w.rongful act. His possession is analogous to that of a 
donee under a void gift who can, by holding for the statutory period, acquire" 
a title good against the donor and all others claiming through him. Why 
therefore should the life tenant be estopped from denying the title of one 
who is not in privity with the life tenant's source of title. If however the 
will is valid then there is a common source of title. The life tenant does 
not then hold adversely to the devisor; and if his possession perfects the 
defective title of the testator the benefit should enure to those in remainder. 
It is submitted that the American decisions are not sound in principle and 
that the better doctrine is that applied by the English courts. 
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AuTOHOBILES-STATUTE GIVING VEHICLE APPROACHING FROM: THS RlGH'l' 
THS RIGHT OF WAY-VIO~ATION OF STATUTE AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENC2 
Pe& Si::.-A Minnesota statute provides that the driver of any vehicle ap-
proaching an intersection shall give the right of way to any other vehicle 
approaching from his right. In an action to recover for damage to his car 
resulting from a -collision with the defendant'~ car at an intersection, the 
plaintiff's own "testimony demonstrated that the defendant's car was approach-
ing from the plaintiff's right. Held; that the plaintiff's proceeding in violation 
.of the· statute was contributory negligence as a matter of law. Lindahl v. 
Morse, (Minn., 192I), 181 N. W. 323. 
The decision merely follows the general rul!! that violation of a statute 
is negligence per se. -Travers v. Hartma1i, 28 Pel. 302, (riding a bicycle down 
the left side of the street); Donova1~ v. Lambert, 139 Ill. App. 532, (driving 
a buggy down the wrong side of the street). However, the violation of the 
statute must be the proximate cause of. the injury. Coffin v. Laskaw, 8g 
Conn. 325; Reynolds v. Pacific Car Company, 75 Wash. I. A distinction is 
sometimes drawn between violations of statutes and viol~tions of city ordi-
nances, the latter violations being merely prima facie evidence of negligence. 
Scott v. Dow, I62 Mich. 636. 
BoUNTIES-,DRAFTED MAN INDUCTED INTO MILITARY SERVICE BUT ReJECT£J> 
AT CANTONMENT NoT ENTITLED TO BoNus.-The Public Laws of Rhode Island, 
Chapter I832, Sectio.n 2, provided that a bonus be granted "To· each * * * 
eniisted man * * * who was mustered into the federal service and reported 
for active duty on or after April 6, I917, and prior to November II, 1918." 
Plaintiff ·was inducted into service during this period but was promptly re-
jected upon reaching camp because of bad teeth. Upon petition for a writ of 
certiorari praying that the record of the decision of the Sold,iers' Bonus Board 
disallowing the plaintiff's application for a bonus be quashed, it was held, that 
plaintiff was never mustered into the service within the meaning of the 
statute and: therefore the plaintiff was not entitled to a bonus. BaKKister v. 
Soldiers' Bonus Board, (R. I., 1921), II2 Atl. 422. 
As pointed out in Tyler v. Pomero)', go Mass. 48<>, "as late as -the reign of 
Charles H, the greatest lawyers in England overlooked the distinction be-
tween martial and military Iaw,-between the military rule, not limited to 
the army, which prevails in time of war, when the civil laws have lost their 
fotce, and the military discipline, necessary to the government of an army 
at all times." It is true, as plaintiff contended, that if he had refused to obey 
the order to report at camp after he .had been inducted into service by the 
local draft board he would have been liable to punishment as a deserter:--not 
because he had been "mustered into service," howeve11. but because he was 
subject to military law and regulations as provided in Section 2 of the 
Selective Service law. The fact that plaintiff had .received a $6o bonus under 
the National Soldiers' Bonus Act is not controlling, for the provisions of that 
act are different from the provisions of the statute construed in the instant 
case. The federal bonus' act contains no provision that the applicant must 
have been "mustered into the federal service." The interpretatioi:i put upon 
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the word "muster" by the court in the instant case, which no doubt seems at 
first blush to be extremely technical, is nevertheless sustained by a great 
number of adjudged cases· both in this country and in England. Methuen v. 
Martin., Sayer, I07; Grant v. Gould, 2 H. Bl. I03i Wolton v. Gavin, I6 Q. B. 
-48; Bamfield v. Abbot, 9 Law Rep. SIOj Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. (U. S.) 
20. Certainly such an interpretation carries out the probable intent of the 
legislature in passing the Act. Moreover, it scarcely can be contended that 
the result reached by the court was not an equitable one. 
CARRn:RS-CoNTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PASSENGt:R IN FAILING TO WilN 
TAXI DRIV<:R OF IMPENDING DANG<:R.-While the plaintiff was riding in one 
of the defendants cabs the driver negligently came into collision with another 
car. .According to the testimony of the plaintiff she saw the other car ap-
proaching on an intersecting street when both cars were one hundred feet 
from the intersection but failed to warn the driver of the taxicab. The trial 
court refused to give a charge on contributory negligence. Held, that there 
was no evidence sufficient to support a charge of contributory negligence. A 
taxicab company is a common carrier of passengers, and "a .. passenger has the 
right to rely upon the presumption that the carrier is familiar with the dangers 
to be apprehended and will use all necessary skill and vigilance to avoid 
them." McKeller v. Yellow Cab Co., Inc., (Minn., I92I), 18I N. W. 341!. 
A taxicab company is generally held to be a common carrier, the reason 
being that it holds itself out to serve all who apply for transportation at a 
fixed charge. Carlton v. Boudar, u8 Va. 52I; Van Hoefjen v. Columbia 
Taxicab Co., 179 Mo. App. 59I. Hence, they are bound. to do all that human 
care and foresight can reasonably do, consistent wit)l the character and mode 
of conveyance adopted, to prevent accidents and injuries to passengers _carried 
by them. Boland v. Gay, 201 Ill. App. 35I. Even though a negligent act on 
the 
0
part of the passenger which proximately contributes to the inh1ry may 
preclude his recovery from the carrier, it is generally held that mere failure 
to act even in the face of imminent danger will not. Grand Rapids & In-
diana R. Co. v. Ellison, II7 Ind. 234. Thus, where a passenger on a railrciad 
saw a tx:ain approaching on an intersecting road, his failure to warn the engi-
neer by pulling the bell cord was held not to preclude his recovery: Grand 
Rapids & Indiana R. Co. v. Ellison, supra. And a passenger on a bus is 
not guilty of contributory negligence in failing to warn the driver of 
excessive speed. Harmon v. Barber, 247 Feq. I. And a passenger on a train·. 
is not bound to notify the conductor of the presence of an iron frame which 
is likely to fall and injure him. Difje11derfer v. Penn. R. Co., 67.Penn. Super. 
Ct. Rep. 187. The law correctly draws a distinction between the duty of the 
passenger in a taxicab and the duty of a guest in an automobile to warn the 
driver of impending perils. As to the duty of the guest, see Howe \'. Core:y, 
{~is., 1920), I79 N. W. 791. I9 M1cu. L. RE\'. 433. 
CARRIERS-DEGREE oF CARE Nr,cr:ssARY IN KF.EPiNG A1s~t:s FRtt.-Plaintiff 
had been a passen.ger in a Pullman chair car and sued for an injury received 
from stumbling over a footstool in th~ ,aisle. He was no~ .allow.ed to recover 
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since it was held, that a railroad company is only liable for the failure to 
exetcise ordinary ·care in -seeing that the movable hassocks provided in a chair 
car do not project into the aisle. Bassell v. Hines, (C. C. A., 6th Circuit, 
'December, 1920), 269 Fed. 231. 
In general the common carrier of passengers is liable for the failure to 
exercise the highest degree of care and prudence consistent with the exercise 
of its business. Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bobo, 232 Fed. 7o8-; Meyer v. St. 
Louis Co., 54 Fed. u6. The basis of this seems -to be that when the pas-
senger delivers himself-into the custody of the carrier, he submits himself 
to his care and relies upon the carrier's protection from all the hazards of the 
journey. bidianapolis Co. v. Horst, 93 U. S. 291, _23 Ii. Ed. 898. ·since the 
basis of this rule is protection of the passeng(!r from the dangers peculiarly 
incident to the instrumentality of transportation, the reason for the rule ceases 
when questions arise as to liability for the trifling dangers that are found 
upon the railroad car in the same way that they might be p·resent in the w11lks 
of every-day life. Stumbling over a hassock which is under the control of 
the passenger takes away the responsibility that is present in the case of those 
clements of travel that are within the sole control and management of the 
carrier. Hence the general weight of authority supports the principal case in 
liolding that only ordinary care need be exercised by the carrier in the cases 
of obstructions placed in the aisle and within the control of passengers. 
Thus, baggage left in the aisle and causing injury places no liability on the 
carrier unles-s there has been actual notice to the carrier's si:rvants of its 
presence there, or it has been there such a time as to imply constructive notice. 
Burns v. Penn. R. Co., 233 Pa. 304; Palmer v. Penn. Co., III N. Y. 488, 18 
N. E. 859; Atkinson v. IJ.ean, 198 Ala. 262, 73 So. 479. On the other hand; if 
it appears that the carrie~ has had time to notice the presence of the baggage, 
as in Chicago and A. R. Ry. Co. v. Buckmaster, 74 .Ill. App. 57S, where a bag 
was left in the aisle two hours, or where the porter of the car has had actual 
notice of the presence of the bag in the aisle, the carrier has been held liable 
for the injuries resuJting therefrom. Levien v. Webb, 61 N. Y. Supp. 1u3. 
In only a· few cases are there any intimations of a different rule from that in 
the principal.case. In Heineke v. Chi. Ry. ·co., 279 Ill. 210, u6 N. E. 761, a 
higher degree of care seems necessarily implied from the statement of the 
court to the effect that if the carrier might have. known of the presence of 
the baggage, it would be liable. And in Pitcher v. Old Colony Co., 196 Mass. 
69, St N. E. 876, the statement of the trial court that the carrier must exercise 
"the highest degree of care consistent with the practical carrying on of its 
business" was not criticised. For a collection ot cases of this type, see 13 
L. R. A. (N. S.), 482, and 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1050. 
CARRIERS-RATS Rr:GuLATION: FIXING RATtS oN SINGLE CLAss oF Co11-
11on1Tms-Suit to restrain the railroad from receiving any other compensation 
for carrying certain classc;s of property than that specified in the order of the 
·state Railroad Commission. The railroad claims that the order did not allow 
sufficient revenue to reimburse it on such commodities, and yield a fair re-
turn. Plaintiff claims that revenue fropi whole intrastate business of de-
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Cendant may be taken into account, in determining remuneration. Held, state 
may not select certain goods, and compel railroad to carry without remunera-
tion, even though revenue from intrastate business as a whole gives a profit. 
Vandalia Railroad Co. v. Sc/mull, (Feb., I92I), U. S. Supreme Court. 
This decision clinches the doctrine laid down in N. Pac. Ry. Co. Y. North 
Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, I3 MICH. LAW Ri::v. 676 •. The basis of that decision 
was that the State may not segregate one class of goods, and compel a rail-
road to carry it without substantial compensation, for this might compel 
carrying some other class of goods at a double profit. A railroad may be 
compelled to operate a branch passenger line at an actual loss, if its whole 
state passenger service gives remuneration; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Ka'Mas, 2I6 
U. ·S. 262. But it is now settled that in deciding whether passenger rates are 
confiscatory, the passenger service must be considered· by itself, and not in 
connection with freight; N~rfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 005; Pa. 
Rd. Co. v. Philadelphia County, 220 Pa. St. Ioo; see Groesbeck Y. Duluth, S. 
S. & A. Ry. Co., 250 U. S. 6o7. In regard to freight, it is not essential that 
the railroad earn the same percentage of profit on all classes of sen·ice. See 
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, supra. The Supreme Court seems to have 
been feeling its way· to the position taken in the North Dakota case, and the 
principal case. In Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. v. Minn., I86 U. S. 257, 
it was suggested that each case must be determined on its own merits, al-
though the contention of the railroad, that if the rate on the particular 
commodity were to be applied to all other classes of commodities, the road 
could not pay operating expenses, was answered by saying that the Commis-
sion need not reduce all rates; but may reduce one, if considered too high. 
The difficulty of determining the cost of transporting a given commodity was 
brought out in N. Pa.c. R. Co. v. Not'th Dakotc, 2I6 U. S. 579, and it was 
held that where there ~re too many elements of uncertainty in determining 
it, the constitutional question is not presented. See Atl. Coast Line Rd. Co. 
v. Florida, 203 U. S. 256. If the determination of the cost of carrying a single 
class of commodities were· clearcut and exact, there could be no quarrel with 
the principal case, as that would be a business-like method. But it may well 
be that temporarily,· the public interest is pest served by permitting certain 
commodities to be carried at a large profit, while compelling others to be 
carried without remuneration. Differences in rates and percentage of profit 
are undoubtedly unavoidable; they should not be disproportionate. Hence, 
it seems difficult to fix a rate without relation to other rates, and to the whole 
schedule of rates. Southern Ry: Co. v. Atlanta Works, 128 Ga. at>]. But with 
improvement in accounting, the principal case would be correct. Perhaps it 
is in advance of the time. Cf. Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Rd. Commissio,., 251 
U.S. 2¢. And it would seem that it is not"the railrqad, which makes a profit 
from its intrastate business as a whole, but rather the shipper of other com-
modities, on which the rate must be disproportionately high; who has the 
right to complain. · , 
CHAMP:ERTY AND MAINTENANc&-CONTRACT PROHIBITING DISMISSAL OJc!.· 
ACTION W1THouT ATTORN:EY's CoNSENT.-Ati attorney made a contract with 
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his client providing that the. case should not be settled or compromised· with-
out his consent, and that if the settlement should be made contrary to this 
agreement, he should be entitled to damages of $r,ooo. rhe client settled and 
dismissed for nothing. In a suit for the $:{,(XlO dam"ages, held, that the" con-
tr<!Ct was void and unenforceable. Hall v. Orloff, (Cal. App., r920), 194 
Pac.29(5. . 
Such a clause in contracts between attorney and client for a contingent 
fee has frequentiy been held void: North. Chicago Ry. C(), v. Ackley, (18g8), 
171 Ill. ioo. Re Snyder, (1907), 190 N. Y. 66. Other cases may be found·in 
14 L. R. A. (.N. S.) nor. However other· courts "have held that such a pro-_ 
vision "is a proper stipulation as a measure of ·protection to the attotney's in-
terest. Re Fernbacker, (1886), 18 Abb.-N. C. I· (N. Y.). The ·rule in Lips-
fomb v. Adams, (1966), 193 Mo. 530, that such a clause might 'or.might not 
contravene public policy depending- upon the geOd faith of the conduct and 
dealings of the parties under it, is an anomal}". In construing contracts with 
provisions of this nature it is gener~lly ·held that the .provision as to settle-
ment is an integral .part of.1in entire agreement and if i.t is void. the whole' 
contract falls. Davis v. Webber, (18gg)·, 66 Ark. Igo. This is tlie view 
adopted in the case in question, and is-.probabfy the better _view, as th~ attor-
ney can s"till recover in general assumpsit for the reasonable value of his 
services, as pointea' out in the principal cas.e. The decision -as a whole, is in 
accordance wlth the· modem idea of enco·uraging conciliation, for such a stip-
ulation tends to prevent this and stands in the way-qf ~micable adjustment of 
controversi~s. The: distinction sought to be drawn between the principal. case 
~1d the prior California case of Hoff.1na1J. v .. Vallejo, (1873), 45 Cal. 564, 
do.es not seem to be wholly satisfactory, and there might be some question 
whether the Appellate Court, being bound by this prior decision of "the Su-
preme Court, shouid not have decided t~e case the other way. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEFINING ·OF TREASON IN Ftn!tRAI. CONSTITUTION 
Doi::s NOT Lr:u:IT Pow:ER oit STATE TO DEAL WITH "CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM."-- · 
~ef'endant was convicted for violati~n of a state statute maki~g the advocacy 
of crime as a means of changing the social order, or the organizing of or be-
longing to, an organization advocating crime for such purpose; a felony: and 
appealed on the ground th.at the statute was unconstitutional ber-ause it 
am6unted to an attempt to punish constructive treastm. Held, the df.aning of 
treason in the Federal Constit1,1iion docs not limit the power of the state to 
pass such a statute. State v. H.emiessy,_ (Wash., r921), 195 Pac. 211. 
Counsel fo"r the defen"dant in the principal case would seem to have 
grasped at a last straw. Their argument on the point covers a wide range, 
and the clauses in the Federal. Constitution forbidding the abridgemen·t of 
free s:peech, and the abridgement of privileges and immunities .of citizel}s of 
.the United States are brought into it, for some reason, in addition to the 
provision defining treason. Undoubtedly the state statute is l?roader than the 
constitutional provision that treason against the United States shall consist 
only in levying war against them or aiding their enemies, for an overt act is 
required "and there is no constructive tr~ason. In re Charge to Grand fur)', 
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s Blatch. 549. "J4eyying war," however, includes forcible opposition, as the 
result of a combination, to the execution of any public law of the Gnited 
States. U.S. v. Mitchell, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 348; U.S. v. Vigol, 2 Dall. (U. S:) 
346. The opposition must include: (I) A combination or conspiracy, by 
which different individuals are united for one purpose; (2) a common pur-
pose to prevent the execution of a public law of the United Stat~s; (3) the 
actual use of force to pre'vent the execution of the law. I.n re Charge to 
Grand Jury, 2 Curt. 630. The last would be unnecessary under the \Vashing-
ton statutes. Clearly, however, the treason clause was not intended to ·1imit 
the power of the states to protect .their institutions from dangerous and 
destructive attacks of any. nature, merely because they have not ripened into 
treason. Ex.parte Bal/mat~, 8 U. S. 75. It would seem to be absurd to con-
tend for the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States to 
-<>rganize for the purpose of ·advocating crime and violence as a means of 
effecting or resisting political ·change. The only possible constitutional objec-
tion is that freedom of speech is abridged by the statute. The "'ashington 
Consti~tion protects freedom of speech but excepts the abuse of the right. 
Violations of similar statutes have been held to be such abuses as to be with-
out the constitutional protection. State v. Fox, 71 Wash. 185, affirmed 236 
U. S. 273; State v. M oilen, 140 Minn. 112. Certainly the federal guaranty does 
not extend to incitement to crime and violence. 19 MxcH. L. R£v. 48i; 
FIUlUND, POLICE Powtt, p. 510. It is absurd t'o suppose that any sovereignty 
will allow its safety and welfare to be undermined by literal interpretations of 
constitutional ~aranties. 
CoNSTI'l'UTIONAL LAW-STAT£ CEMENT PLANT.-The Governor of South 
Dakota addressed an inquiry to the judges of the Supreme Court as to the 
validity of an issue of bonds -under an act of the legislature providing for the 
establishment of a state cement plant. The constitution of the state declares 
that the manufacture, distribution and sale of cement are works of public 
jlecessity ana importance, in which the state may engage. H cld, that taxa-
tion for such purpose is ·constitutional. In re Opinion of the J11dges, (So. D .• 
1920), I8o N. W. 957. 
'rhat a tax should be in aid of a public purpose is inherent in the power 
of taxation, and the co.urts can declare a tax invalid, if it is· not for a public 
purpose, without tlie aid of a constitutional provision. GR.w, TAXATio:.r, 123- · 
129; It is common, however, for .state constitutions to include a prohibition 
against taxing for other than a public purpose. The United States Supreme 
Court is not justified in·holding an act in violation of the state constitution 
in the face of clear decisions of the state supreme court to the contrary; sec 
Fallbro,ok lrrigatio.11 Distri<t v. Bradley, 164 U. S. u2, 155. "The due process 
of law clause contains no specific limitations upon the right of taxation in 
the states, but it has come to be settled that the al)thority of the states to tax 
does not_; include th.e right to impose taxes for merely private purpose~." 
Green v. fra::icr; 253 U.S. 233, 40 Sup. Ct. 499, 501. See Jt:osox- o"-s TAX,\Tiox, 
§ § 340, 343. On the authority of Gr.ec11 v. Pra::icr, the judges in the principal 
case were of the opinion that the Supreme Court would consider this valid 
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under the Fourteenth Amendment, if the case were before them. In Grec11 
v. Fra:;ier, a statute creating a state bank, mill and elevator association, and a 
home building association, under the authority of the constitution of the 
state, was held valid, considering the peculiar condition of the state. The 
court says, "With this united action of people, legislature and constitution, 
we are not at liberty to interfere unless it is clear beyond reasonable contro-
versy that rights secured by the Federal Constitution have b-. -·'-'"lted." 
This would seem to be th€ rule even where there is no sanction by the state 
constitution. If so, another strong case is Jones v. Portland, 245 U. S. 217, 
where a municipal wood and coal yard, authorized by statute alone, fuel to 
be furnished at cost to buyers, was upheld. To be sure, the court considered 
it a means of furnishing heat, and sufficiently analogous to furnishing light 
and water to be a public purpose. Massachusetts has held municipal fuel 
yards to be not a public purpose; Opi11wn of the Justices, I55 Mass. 598, 
Opiliion of the Justices, 182 Mass, 6o5. See Baker v. Grand Rapids, I42 Mich. 
687. To determine whether or not a particular tax is for a public purpose, 
the direct beqefit to the public should be taken into account, aiso a considera-
tion of what is feasible for the government to do, under exis·=-..,. conditions; 
i. e., whether the particular function could not be better done by private in-
dividuals, and also, whether conditions, under which it has been considered 
unfeasible have changed·. See Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655, 
Opinions of the Justices, supra, and in 2II Mass. 624. A county cement plant, 
without a constitutional provision authorizing it, was held not to be a public 
purpose in Los Angeles v. Leids, I75 Cal. 777. Allowing municipal water-
wo~ks to manufacture ice was held to be a public purpose in .H oltori v. Camilla, 
I34 Ga. 56o. In Unio1i Ice and Coal Co. v. Ruston, I35 La. 898, a municipal 
ice plant was held not a public purpose, but the court said, "no one would 
contest the right * * * if the town were of proper size for such .a thing," 
under a state constitution requiring "strict" public purpose, for municipal 
undertakings. North Dakota v. Nelso1i Co., I N. D. 88, under' constitutional 
prohibition against taxing for aid of individuals except for necessary support 
of the poor, a statute authorizing distributi~n of seed corn to needy farmers 
on credit, in time of drouth, was held valid. Jones v. Portland, Green v. 
Fra::ier, supra, and the· principal case seem to show a tendency towards pater-
nalism, for these undertakings seem to be peculiarly fitted for private under-
taking, although municipal fuel yards may be perfectly proper. If a state 
can be permitted to operate cement plants, there seems to be little it could 
not do. · 
CR111uN.'>L LAw-AssAt:LT WITH INTENT TO RoD-Ci..-.ru oF OWNERSHIP.-
Claiming that Green owed him $ISO, defendant demanded payment at the 
point of a pistol, and upon Green's saying that he had nothing, defendant hit 
him on the head with the pistol. Held, if defendant in good faith believed 
that Green owed him the money, his offense was not assault with intent to 
rob. Barton v. State, (Tex., 192I), 2Z}' S. W. 317. 
It is well settled "that the taking, by force or putting in fear, of specific 
property under bona fide claim of. right thereto, is not robbery, Glen11 v. 
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State, 49 Tex. Cr. R. 349; or larceny, People v. }] oagla11d, 138 Cal. 338; State 
v. Wasson, 126 Iowa 320. because of the absence of the animus furandi. The 
proposition that such taking of general property to satisfy a debt is not rob-
bery now seems to be as well established, for the instant case -overrules the 
one outstanding authority _to the contrary. Fannin v. State, 51 Tex. Cr. R 
41. Neither is such taking to satisfy a debt larceny. Johnson v. Stat.:, 73 
Ala. 523; Com. v. Stebbins, 8 Gray 492. Of course, there must be a bona fide 
belief in the claim of right. Some courts hold. it robbery when the loser in 
a gambling transaction forces the winner to return his money. Carrol v. 
State, 42 Tex. Cr. R. 30. See Grant v. State, II5 Ga. 205, contra. As far as 
the law is concerned, a regime of debt collectors "with their courts in theit 
right hip pockets" is discouraged only by the penalties for trespass, breach 
of peace, etc. In accord with the instant case, see Reg. v. Hemming, 4 F. & 
F. 50; State v. Holly.va)'. 41 Iowa 200; State v. Bro-um, 104 Mo. 365, cited 
therein. 
DAMAGES-CONTINUOUS TRESPASS OR REPEATED WRONG.-Defendant coal 
company had worked over the boundary between its own claim and that of the 
plaintiff, and removed from the plaintiff's land large quantities of coal. It 
was admitted by the officers of the defendant corporation that they had 
knowledge of the encroachments upon plaintiff's property as early as January, 
1913, so that the original trespass must have occurred prior to that date. 
Apparently, however, the defendants continued. to work across the line after 
that time and to remove: coal from the plaintiff's claim. Defendants after-
wards abandoned these workings and allowed the superincumbent soil to cave 
in. Late in 1916, the plaintiff and his engineer recognized that these encroach-
ments had occurred, but were de.nied admission to the defendant's mine to 
ascertain the extent of the encroachments, on the plea that they could not· 
get back to the division line because of the cave-in. Suit was begun March 
28, 1918. The st!ltute of limitations was pleaded. It was held, that "the 
statute begins to run only from the time of the actual discovery of the 
trespass or from the time when discovery was reasonabfy possible," not from 
the time of the trespass. Petrelli v. West Virginia .Coal Co., (W. Va., 1920), 
104 s. E. 103. 
Attention has before been called to the fact that neither courts nor legis-
latures seem to be satisfied with the conclusions reached in the English case 
of Clegg v. Dearden, (1848), 12 Ad. and El. (N. S.) 575, and in the Michigan 
case of The National Copper Co. v. Minnesota Mining Co., (1885), 57 Mich. 
83, on the subject of so-called continuous trespass. Cf. 19 MICH. L. REV. 375 
In the instant case the -court of \Vest Virginia has followed the court of 
Pennsylvania in its solution of the problem, coming to a conclusion which 
satisfies the sense of justice, but the legal theory of whic'h is somewhat diffi-
cult to explain .. The West Virginia court cites Lewey ·v. H. C. Fricke Coal 
<;o., .(1895), 166 Pa. 536, as a precedent £-or its decision. See also Kingston 
v. Lehigh Vall~y Coal Co., (1913), 241 Pa . .¢9. Although this argument gives 
us a just decision, by postponing the time when the statute begins to run, it 
·is a little difficult to see on principle how the dis.covery of a wrong can be 
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used to date the inception of a cause of action arising from the wrong and 
the consequent beginning of the period of limitation. If, however, we admit 
that each day's concealment of the fraud is a new wrong, we would have a 
new cause of action every day so long as the concealment continued. In the 
instant case we have evidence of the concealment of th"e wrong within the 
statutory period, in the refu.sal of the defendants to give to the plaintiffs 
access to the defendant's mine. The Michigan court has decided, in Groendal 
v. Weslrate, (1912), 171 Mich. 92, that the plaintiff's action for malpractice 
of her physician was not barred by the statute, although the caus~ of action 
arising from the initial negligence of the physician was barred, because with-
in the statutory period he had "fraudulently and purp~sely concealed from 
her the nature of her injury." If the "fraudulent concealment" of the statute 
(Act No. 168, Pub. Acts 1905, being section 9729, 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS, as 
amended), were generalized as a "repeated :wrong,''· which would give rise 
to a new cause of action arising on the occurrence of such a wrong, the bar 
of the statute of limitations would be removed, whether the wrong were an 
injury to land, as in the instant case; an injury to the person, as in the mal-
practice case, Groendal v. w estraie (supra.) ; or an injury to reputation, ?-S i~ 
the slander or libel cases, Dick \'. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., (1915), 86 Wash. 
2n. Cf. 18 MicH. L. REv. 679; 19 MICH. L. Rsv. 381. 
EVID:eNCE-CRIMINAI. LAW-PROOF OF NONCONSENT llY CIRCUMSTANTlAI. 
EvIDENCE.-In a prosecution for knowingly and unlawfully taking or killing 
the cattle of another, no direct evidence of the owner's nonconscnt was of-
fered though the owner was present at the trial. The defendant moved for 
a <lirected verdict on the ground of a lack of proof as to the nonconsent of 
the owner to the killing. ·Held, motion denied as there were facts from which 
the nonconsent could be inferred. State Y. Parry, (N. Mex., 1920), 194 
Pac. 864 · -
· The crime in the principal. case, like that of larceny; rests on the non-
consent of the owner to the taking or the killing, otherwise the act would 
be lawful. It is the lack of consent that renders the act unlawful. This non-
consent of the own~r must be shown in order to obtain a conviction, for 
otherwise no larceny would be established, Garcia v. State, 26 Tex. 209. As 
to what kind of evidence is necessary to establish the nonconsent of the owner 
there is some conflict. An early English case,_in a prosecution for coursing 
deer without ·the consent of the ownel', held that it was necessazy on the part 
of the prosecu~ion to call the owner of the deer to prove that he did not give 
his consent to ~he defendant to course them. Rex v. Rogers, 2 Camp. 654. 
This doctrine has been entirely repudiated and rejected by later English de-
cisions. Rex v. Hat:y, 2 C. & P. 458; Rex v. Allen, I Moody C. C. 154. But 
that case became the foundation for the doctrine that circumstantial evidence 
as "to the nonconsent may· be resorted to only when direct evidence of the 
owner is not ob~ainable. This doctrine is asserted in PHII.I.IPS 'ON EVIDENCE, 
[4th Ed.] 635, and ·has been followed by a few states. State v. Osborne, 28 
Ia. 9. At one•time Nebraska and Wisconsin also asserted this doctrine. Bub-· 
ster v. State,. 33 Neb. 663; State v. Morey, 2 'Vis. 495. Bu! they have now 
RECENT IMPORT ANT DECISIONS 751 
abandoned it for the doctrine that nonconsent may be shown by circum-
stantial evidence even where the owner is present. Nixon v. State, 89 Neb. 
xog; Fowle v. State, 4i \.Vis. 545. The Texas courts seem also to hold that 
direct evidence where obtainable must be produced. Gomez v. State, (Tex. 
Cr. App.), 2o6 S. W. 8Q. The doctrine thus asserted seems based on the so 
called "best evidence" rule. But there is no general principle that the best 
evidence must be produced in an cases. There are only a few definite excep-
tions where the best possible evidence is required. 2 W1GMORE's Evro:eNcr:, 
§ 1286; Elliot v. Va1~ Buren, 33 Mich. 49- The present case is not one for 
testimonial preference. That direct evidence of the nonconsent of the owner 
in larceny is not required, but that, on the other hand, such nonconsent may 
be established circumstantially is well recognized by the weight of authority 
and reason. People v. Jacks, 76 Mich. 218; McAdams v. State, 23 Wyo. 294; 
Filson v. Terr., 11 Okl. 351. There is no reason for requiring direct testi-
mony by the owner of his nonconsent in these cases where nonconsent is an 
element.of the crime. The court in the principal case rightly held that the 
presumption of innocence in favor of the defendant was always sufficient 
protection against an unjust conviction upon circumstantial evidence of non-
consent. The. defense in such a situation might assert the well recognized 
general principle that non-production of evidence that naturally would be 
produced by an honest party permits the inference that its tenor is unfavor-
able to that party's cause. Clifton v. U. S., 4 How. 247 .. So where the owner 
is not called by the prosecution to testify to his' nonconsent, an inference is 
imputable that his testimony would be unfavorable to the prosecution, that if 
called he would admit consent. But where the witness is equally available to 
both parties, it would seem no inference cou.ld be allowed, particularly where 
the witness is actually in court,-Crawf ord v. State, II2 Ala. 1,--or that the 
inference would be available to both parties, the strength of. the inference 
against either depending on circumstances. Harriman v. Railroad, 173 Mass. 
28. In the principal case the inference could hardly be made use of by the 
defense for the owner as a witness was equally available to both parties j-to 
the defense to prove consent if such was the fact. In some cases this infer-
ence might, however, become most advantageous to the defense. 
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF-GRANTOR'S ORAL AGREEMENT TO INCLUDt RESTRIC-
TION CLAUSES IN DEEDS TO OTHER PeRSONS Vom.-A subdivision was platted 
with the intention of making it a high-class residence section. The owner of 
the tract sold lots to plaintiffs subject to building restrictions contained in the 
deeds, and orally promised to place building restriction clauses in deeds to 
other persons: The defendant church purchased a lot without a restrictive 
clause, but with knowledge of the general plan. P now seeks to enjoin D 
from erecting a church on "the lot. Held, that D, having notice of the plan 
was estopped from constructing the church on the lot. Johnson v. Mt. Baker 
Park Presbyterian Church, (Wash., 1920), 194 Pac. 536. 
The defendant's contention was that plaintiff could not have any legal 
ground for enjoining the erection of church, unless he had an interest or 
easement in the lot, and that the only evidence of such i_nterest was ia the 
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oral promise of the grantor to plaintiffs that it would incorporate the usual 
restrictive clauses in all deeds made by it, which was void under the Statute 
of Frauds. The court disposes of this claim by saying that the oral promise 
would be unenforcible as an attempt to create an interest in the lands to be 
conveyed, but that in this case the plaintiffs have no interest or easement in 
defendant's land in the sense of the Statute of Frauds. The court gives no 
e.xplanation of why the agreement is, not within the Statute of Frauds. It is 
difficult to understand why the right claimed by the plaintiffs, to control and 
dictate as to the use which should be made of this lot, and the manner in 
which defendant should buil~ upon it, is not an interest in the land within 
the Statute. In Sprague v. Kimball, 2I3 Mass. 38o, it was held that such an 
agreement as is involved here created an interest in the land within the 
Statute. See also, Ham v. Massoit Real Estate Co., (R. I.), 107 Atl. I205; 
I9 MICH. L. REV. 2I9. However, conceding that the promise in this case is 
within the statute, in some jurisdictions the decision might be- supported on 
the theory of estoppel. Lennig v. Oicean City Ass'n, 4I N. ]. Eq. 6o6; Woods 
v. Lawrence, (Tex.), I09 S. W. 4I8. For a general discussion of the qu~ 
tion see, TII'FANY, REAL PROP.ERTY, Vol. 2, [2nd Ed.] I425 et seq; 45 L. R. A. 
(N. S.) 962; I6 MICH. L. R:sv. 90. 
FRAuns, STATUTE oF-Pl.EADING SIGNED BY CouNSEL SuFFICttNT MQC-
ORANDUH WITHIN 4TH SECTION OF STATUTE OF FRAuns.-A sued B for specific 
performance of a contract to sell a house. Defense, signed by counsel, that 
B had already contracted to sell to C, and counterclaim for rescission. A 
then added C as defendant. C relied on his contract, and counterclaimed that 
he was entitled to the house free from A's claim. A in answer to C relied 
on the Statute of Frauds. Held, that B's defense (which contained all the 
terms of C's contract) was a sufficient memorandum within the Statute, and 
therefore specific performance was denied. Grindell v. Bass [Ig2(>], 2 Ch. 487· 
The purpose of the Statute is not to impose a new rule of law as to what 
constitutes a valid contract, but only to require a formality of proof in order 
to make a contract enforceable. WILLISTON ON CoNTRACTS, SECTION 579. 
Therefore, it is immaterial with what purpose the requirement of the Statute 
is fulfilled. The parties do not need to intend the paper signed to be a mem-
orandum of sale. They may have the contrary intention. For example, it is 
not unusual for a party to write a letter, in which, after stating the terms of 
the bargain, he repudiates it, or refuses to enter into a written contract. Yet 
the courts have consistently held that such a" letter satisfies the require~ents 
of the Statute. Drury v. Young, 58 Md. 546; Heideman v. Wolfstein, 12 Mo. 
App. 366; Poel v. Brunswick Balke-Callender Co., II4 N. Y. S. 725; Deiuar 
v. Mintoft, [I912] 2 K. B. 373. It is certainly true that the attorney in the 
instant case had no authority to sign a memorandum of the sale; but, it goes 
without saying, that he did have authority to sign the pleadings filed in the 
former suit. The Statute requires that the memorandum be signed by the 
party to be charged, or "by his agent thereunto lawfully authorized." But· 
authorized to do what? Must he be authorized to sign a note or memorandum 
of sale, or is it sufficient if he is authorized to sign the paper .which he did 
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in fact sign? There seems to be no authority in this country on this par-
ticular point. But an English case, Cycle Corp. v. Humber, [1899] 2 Q. B. 
414, held, in accordance with the conclusion in the instant case, that it was 
sufficient if the agent was authorized to sign the· particular document which 
he did sign. It is submitted that this is the correct view. 
GA1u:-RIGuT TO SHOOT Wn.n FowL IN NAVIGABL£ WAttRs.-Defendant 
trustees, acting upon the assumption that they had the exclusive right of 
hunting and fishing in a certain tract, leased certain parts of a bay to a third 
party "for * * * purpose * * * of the gunning privilege and the right of 
shooting wild fowl." Upon the suit of a taxpayer to have the lease set aside 
on the ground that the trustees possessed no right to grant such privileges, 
held, that since the public had a right of passage over the bay it possessed 
the right to shoot wild fowl therein, and the lease was therefore void. Smith 
v. Odell, et al., (N. Y. Supreme Court, 1921), 185 N. Y. S. 647. 
The decision in the instant case proceeds on the theory that the privilege 
of shooting wild fowl is incidental to the right of navigation. Although some 
courts have upheld this doctrine, Ainsworth v. Hunting and Fishing Club, 
153 Mich. 185, u6 N. W. 992; Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, IZJ Pac. 156; 
yet generally where the soil is privately owned the existence of such an inci-
dental right has been denied. Schulte v. Warren, 218 Ill. lo8, 75 N. E. 783. 
See 16 Micu. L. R1::v. 37. The court attempts to justify its stand by drawing 
an analogy between the right to shoot wild fowl on navigable streams and the 
right to take wild game on land upon which one enjoys an easement. The 
answer is that a person who enjoys an easement on the land of another, for 
example for highway purposes, has no incidental right to shoot game thereon. 
He can use the land for highwa'J• purposes 011ly. Any act inconsistent with 
his easement or in excess tliereof makes the person, who up to that point 
was lawfully on the land, a trespasser. Queen v. Pratt, 4 El. & B. 800; Adams 
v. Rivers, II Barb. 390. The same rule should apply to the shooting of wild 
game in navigable waters, in which the public enjoys only a right of passage. 
INFANTS-ACTION FoR P.ReNATAL .INJURIES SusTAINABLt.-In an action 
of negligence for injuries sustained while en Ventre sa mere, it was held, that 
such an action could be sustained under the principles of the common law. 
Drobner v. Peters (1921) 1 186 N. Y. Supp. 278. 
For a good many purposes an infant en ventre sa mere has been con-
sidered in existence, but in no case so far as is known has he been allowed to 
maintain a tort action for personal injuries. In general, however, the trend 
of the decisions seems to be that, for all purposes beneficial to the infant, an 
infant en ventre sa mere may be considered to be born. Thus such a child 
has been considered to be in esse for the purpose of securing a valid limita-
tion of estates, Long v. Blackall, 7 Durn. & East loo; Doe v. Clark, 2 H. 
Black. 399; oi: he may take an· estate by bequest, Thelusson v. Woodford, 4 
Ves. Jr. 22']. Or he may maintain action for the death of his father before 
birth due to the wrongful or negligent acts of another, The George and 
Richard, 3 L. R. Adm. 466; Herndon v. St. Louis & S. F. Rd., 37 Okl. 256, 
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128 Pac. 727; Galvestoii v. Contreras, 31 Tex. Civ. App. 489, 72 S. W. 1051. 
After discu,ssing Nuge11t v. Brookl)•n Heights R. Co., 154 App. Div. (lj7, .139 
N. Y. Supp. 367, which the court regarded as being based up'on the fact that 
no injuries to an infant en ventre sa mere due to the negligence of the carrier 
were recoverable since there was no cQntract of carriage and hence no duty 
on the part of the railroad to the infant, the court adopts the stand -that the 
mere fact that there are no precedents for a negligence action of this char-
acter does not prevent the maintenance of one since the entire policy of the 
law is to protect and give such infants every.right whii:h is for their benefit. 
'!'he fact that a criminal action has long been maintainable for ·injuries causing 
the death of a child while in the mother's womb seem to support an ~ction 
of this sort. A strong clissent, however, presents ·a number of cases that make· 
the decision of the majority. at least questionable. Nugent v. Brooklyn 
Heights Rd. Co., supra, is discussed and considered as authority for the propo-
sition that no such action may be maintained upon the basis that such an action 
is one in tort rather than upon the contract, as the majority opinion states. 
That such is the correct view seems to appear. from the fact that the duty 
of ordinary .care arises in the case even of a gratuitous passenger, and an 
infant en ventre sa mere certainly cannot pe placed in the category of a tres-
passer. Similar cases in which the infant was not allowed to maintain a tort 
action for injuries to itself before birth are Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 
Mass. 14, 75 Am. St. Rep. 176; Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 56 
N. E. 638; Buel v. United Rys. Co., 248 Mo. 126, 154 S. W. '/I, Got'tnan v. 
Budlong, 23 R. I. 169, 91 Am. St. Rep. 629. In view of such authorities to' the 
contrary and with no c:ises to support the action of such child, there seems 
no basis for allowing a child to maintain a negligence action for injuries 
while en ventre sa mere. See 34 HARV. L. REV. 549. 
INSURANCE-ACCIDENTAL DEATH-MILITARY SERVICE.-ln an action by 
the beneficiary named in an insurance policy, which provided for double in-
demnity "in the event of death by accidental means (murder or suicide, sane 
or .insane, not included)," it was held, that the death of the insured, caused 
by his being struck by a piece of shrapnel from an exploded shell while en-
gaged in battle as a soldier, resulted through "accidental means" within the 
terms of the policy. State Life Ins. Co. v. Allison, (C. C. A., Fifth Circuit, 
1920), 269 Fed. 93. 
An injury is not produced by accidental means, within the terms of such 
a policy as _is involved in the principal case, where it is the result of an act 
or acts in which the insured intentionally engages, and is caused by a volun-
tary, natural, ordinary movement, executed as was intended. Stone v. Fidelity 
& Cas. Co. of N. 'Y., 133 Tenn. 672, 182 S. W. 252. But if any mischance 
supervenes· even in such an intentional act, whereby an injury is caused!, the 
injury is deemed accidental. Preferred Acc. Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 213 Fed. 
595. In such a case the injury is accidental in the sense that the injury is an 
unforeseen and unexpected casualty. Accidental means are those which pro-
duce effects which are not their natural and probable consequences. -4 CooI.EY, 
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BRIEFS ON INs., 3159. :Natural consequences are such as ought to be expcctea. 
Probable consequences are those which are more likely to follow from the 
use of a given means than to fail to follow .. Thus, reasons the court in the 
instant case, since chance determines what person or persons shall be killed 
in war, and since "of the. millions who serve as soldiers, comparatively few 
are killed," the insured met death by accidental means, without his design, 
consent, or co-operation, as the result of a hazard incident to his occupation. 
As in another recent case, Interstate Business Men's Acc. As.r'n. of Des 
lrfoi1~es, Io. v. Lester, 257 Fed. 225, where the beneficiaries of a similar policy 
were allowed to recover for the death of an insured physician, who was shot 
and killed while performing his duty as an officer of the National Guard on 
emergency sen.·ice during a strike, the court refused to write into the policy 
an exception to the effect that if the insured engaged in any military service 
the insurance should cease. Every person in the course of his life is neces-
sarily exposed to varying degrees of hazard. Simply going into an environ-
ment where the hazard is greater than that experienced in one's daily employ-
ment cannot remove a chance death in such environment from the class of 
"deaths by accidental means," when the policy does not except such par-
ticular hazards. True, the decision seems to involve a liberal extension of 
the principles enunciated in former cases, yet considering the words of the 
policy and the hazard involved, it seems reasonable and.justified. 
LANDI.ORD AND T£NA:-IT-CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION-NECESSITY FOlt ABAN-
DONMENT.-The defendant rented a theatre building from the plaintiff for 
three years. After a year's occupation the defendant vacated as a result of 
the plaintiff's notice to quit for failure to pay rent. In an action by the plain-
tiff to recover rent the defendant counter-claimed for damages, the basis for 
the counter-claim being an eviction caused by the landlord's using the base-
ment of the building for the purpose of cutting and storing onions. Held, 
that the counter-claim could not be allowed, for the tenant continued to 
occupy the premises and pay rent after the obnoxious odors from the base-
ment became apparent. Tos v. Olinger, (Wis., 1921), i81 N. W. 295. 
A use of the adjoining premise$ by the landlord which materially inter-
feres with the tenant's enjoyment of his own premises may result in a con-
structive eviction of the tenant. 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT, 1279; 
Grosvenor Hotel Company v. Hamilton, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836. The test seems 
to be whether the use to which the adjoining premises are put would con-
stitute a nuisance at common law. 2 TIFFANY, LANDI.ORD AND TENANT, 1281; 
Sully v. Schmitt, 147 N. Y. 248. Hence, if the landlord knowingly rents the 
adjoining premises to a person who operates a house of prostitution, the 
tenant may claim an eviction. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N. Y.) 727. But 
to constitute an eviction the tenant must abandon the premises within a 
reasonable time after the acts complained of. Commelin v. Theiss, 31 Ala. 
412; Fox v. Murdock, 58 Misc. (N. Y.), 207. The principal case did not decide 
whether the "odor with which nature has so bountifully endowed the onion," 
was a nuisance upon which an eviction might be predicated, but wisely eluded 
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this p_erplexing question by holding that there could. be no eviction where the 
teriant thereafter continued in the occupation of the premises. Beecher v. 
Duffield, W Mich. 423·; Taylor v. Finnegaii, 189 Mass. 568. 
LunTATIONs, STATUT£ oF-FRAuD AS RsPLY ro· PI.EA oF THE STA'!'UT£ NPT 
AvAn.ABJ.it· AT LAw.-I~·an actic;m ·at law by the assignees of the pledgor 
against the pledgee; w1iose debt had been paid, to recover the purchase money. 
paid ·to the pledgee by the ptU"chaser of the pledged ·stcick, the evidenee 
showed that the·plaintiff 1tad'sevC!ral times requested the pledgee to turn over 
possession of the stock tQ hiin, buf instead of informing the plaintiff of the 
sale, the pledgee stated that the· stock was in his possession and he would 
turn it .over as soon as he could find the certificates. When the pJaintiff 
learned of the sale he brought this action, and the defendant pleaded the 
Statute of Limitations. Plaintiff replied that defendant was estopped to 
plead the Statute of Limitations .by his fraudulent concealment or the accrual 
of the cause of action. I;leld, (five judges dissenting) the defendant could 
not be estopi;ied by fraudulent concealment to plead. the Statute of Limita-
tions~ in a· court .of law, but that an estoppel of this nature was available only 
in a court of equity as a ground for relief against the prosecution of the action . 
at law. 'Freeman v. Conover· (N. J., 1920) u2 Atl. 324-
The· questjon in this case is whether or not; in an action at law, frauq is 
a proper matter. of reply to a plea of the Statute of Limitations. The· weight 
of authority is that· fraud .is a good reply and operates as an estoppel against 
the· defendant pleading the statute. Holma1~ v. Omaha & C. B. R.y. & Bridge 
Co., U7 Ia. 268; Missouri, etc. Ry. v. ·Pratt~ 73 Kan. 210; Oklahoma Farm 
Mortgage Co. v. Jordan, 168 Pac. 1029; Baker-Mathews Mfg. Co. v. Grayling 
Lwmlier. Co., (Ark.) 203 S. W; 1021; .City .of Fort Worth v. Rosen, (Tex.) 
203 s:W. 8+ Contia, see Pieischv.Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647; St. Joseph & G. I. 
Ry. ·Co: ·V. Elwood Grain Co., (Mo.) 203 S. W. 68o; Harper v; Harper, 252 
Fed.39 . 
.MINIMUM WAG:e ACT-NOT INVALID B:ecAtis:e No PRov1s10N·lS MADI; FoR 
NOTICE TO ,E:MPLOY£Rs:-Under ·an act making it unlawful to employ women 
in any industry at wages inadequat~ for maintenance, the Industrial Welfare 
Commission ordered the minimum wage in the public housekeeping industry 
to be raise<!. to eighteen dollars per week. Plaintiffs, operators of large hotels,. 
contended that the act was void in making no provision for notice to persons 
affected. · Held, ·under its policl" l)ower the legislature, through the Commis-
sion, can take . .away without notice whatever rights the employers have t() 
employ women and minors, since they have no vested right to employ them. 
Spokane Hotel C,o. v. Younger, (Wash., 1920), 194 Pac. 595. 
Plaintiffs did not venture to question the ability of the Legisfature' under 
its police power to. pass· a minimum wage act; its constitutional right to cio 
this seei:ns ·to have been settled. once for all by the case. of Stettler v. O'Hara, 
6g Ore. 51g, which was sustained by the Federal Supreme Court in 243 U. 
·S. 629. The contributions made·by Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger to the law 
~f the subject seem simply to be that such acts do not need to make provision 
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for notice and a hearing, as did the Oregon statute; since employers have no 
ve,sted right to employ women and minors. This view would seem to accord 
with Judge Cooley's definition of a vested right quoted in Pearsall v. Great 
Northern Ry., 161 U. S. at 673, as the right to enjoyment, present or pro-
spettive, that has become the property of some person or persons as a present 
interest. The coµrt's further holding that the power delegated to the Com-
mission by the Legislature was purely administrative seems based on prin-
ciples equally obvious. ·The legislature itself had settled the only question of 
policy involved, that is that an amount adequate for maintenance should be 
established as a minimum wage. There is ample authority to establish the 
principle that it could delegate to a commission the administrative duty of 
determining the fact of what amount would be adequate for maintenance and 
provide that upon the establishment of this fact the law should be· operative, 
Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. at 6g2. 
MUNICIPAL CoRPORA'l'IONS-POWER TO ACT AS TRUSTtt-BURIAL LoT.-A 
bequest was left to a town on condition that the town care for a cemetery lot 
in which testator's family lay buried. Upon petition by the· executor for a 
construction of the will, held, that the bequest created a valid trust which the 
town had authority to accept. Petition of Tuttle, (N. H., 11µ1) n2 Atl. 397. 
A municipal corporation may take arid hold property as a gift or devi~e 
from an individual in trust for specified purposes when the trust created is 
germane to the purposes for which the corporation was organized, and when 
the administration of the trust and the liabilities which it may impose are not 
foreign to the declared objects of the corporation. Hatheway v. Sackett, 3:.;i 
Mich. 97. Justice Story's opinion in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (U. 
S.) IZ/, is particu1arly clear on this point. Historically, bequests to cities for 
trust purposes have long been recognized. One of the earliest of these gifts 
in this country is that of Dr. Franklin .to the cities of Philadelphia and Boston, 
where the fund was used to help young married artificers. Gifts to charitable 
uses are highly favored and liberally construed to accomplish the intent of the 
donor. Woodruff v. Marsh, 63 Conn. 125; Ha"ington v. Pier, 105 Wis. 485. 
A bequest to a city as a trust to provide for the education of the poor was 
upheld in McD011ogh v. Murdock, 14 U. S. 732. Bequests have also been 
upheld for beautifying public grounds, and for establishing hospitals. f'mny 
v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471; Dykeman v. Jenkins, _179 Ind. 549. The care of ceme-
teries has generally been recognized as a proper municipal function within 
the public health duties of a city. Davorck v. Moore, 105 Mich. 120. The 
rule aiainst perpetuities does not apply to gifts for charitable uses. 1/ills v. 
Daviso1i, 54 N. J. Eq. 659. A perpetual trust cannot he created for an in-
dividual and !tis heirs in succession, fqrever; and it is here that a charity 
differs, for a trust may be established which contemplates the payment of 
the income of a certain fund to some charitable purpose forever. 2 P£RRY ON 
TRUSTS, 687. The power of the legislature to alter and abolish municipal cor-
porations is not defeated by the circumstances that the city is a trustee of a 
charity, or of other private rights and interests. l DILLON I8I. See 14 L. R. 
A. (N. S.) 49; IO MicH. L. Rr:v. 31, 120. 
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llUNICIPAL ColtPORATIONS-SniswALKs--Ics CAUSED BY DBAINAG~ FROM 
AWNING-AWNING NO'l' A NUISANCS.-A motion picture theatre had con-
structed an awning in such a manner that water drained .from the awning 
onto the edge of "the sidewalk. The plaintiff was injured by falling on ice 
which had frozen from this water. In" an action against the city, held, that 
the awning was not such a nuisance that the city 'was _bound to remove it. 
Maine v. City of Des Moines, (Iowa, 1921) 181 N. W. 248. 
Where a city by its own act negligently permits water to collect and 
freeze on its wa~s, it is liable for injury proximately resulting to pedestrians. 
Holbert v. Philadelphia, 221 Pa. 266, (failure to keep a sidewalk under a via-
duct properly drained); Walsh v. New York, lOC) App. Div. 541, (leaky 
hydrant adjacent to a sidewalk). But generally the city cannot be held where 
the injury results from the act or omission of the abutting owner. HanrahatJ 
v. Chicago, 145 Ill. App. 38, (awning falling on the plaintiff). But the city 
may be liable where jt negligently allows the abutting owner to retain a nui-
sance, as where the abuttor's awning was constructed so near to the curb that 
a truck knocked out the support and caused the awning to fall on the plaintiff. 
Mansfield v. New York, u9 App. Div. 199. And where the city has been 
compelled to pay damages as a result of the abuttor's act of conveying water 
onto the sidewalk to freeze, i~ is entitled to reimbursement from the abutting 
owner. New York v. Dimric_k, 49 Hun. 241. See 19 MxcH. L. Rsv. 549- It 
seems that the abutting owner may be charged whenever he creates a condi-
tion which artificially causes water to flow upon the sidewalk and freeze so 
that the walk is rendered unsafe for pedestrians. Canfield v. Chicago & W. 
M. R. Co., 78 Mich. 356, (water leaking from a water tank); Molony v. Hayes, 
2o6 Mass. 1, (water from the defendant's roof); .Macauley v. Schneider, 9 
App. Div. 2'79. (water collecting under the abuttor's awning). But the abtittor 
cannot be charged if the water collected on the walk from natural rather than 
from artificial conditions: Greenlaw v. Millikin, 100 Me. 440. 
N£CLIGSNC£-ATTRACTIVS Nu1SANce.-The defendants had at their station 
a-mechanical moving staircase or escalator worked by an endless band. At 
the top, the band passed around a wheel where it was open to sight and 
touch, and was not fenced off or protected. The room was open to the street. 
There was a ticket collector at the bottom of the staircase and another 
behind a window in the booking hall. It was common practice for children 
to play upon the staircase, generally in the evening, by running down as 
far as they could without being caught by the ticket collector at the bottom. 
They were always warned off, and a railway policeman whose duty to·ok 
him into the booking hall twice every hour, always drove the children away. 
On the evening of the accident, he drove them away, but later, they returned, 
and with them the plaintiff, a boy of five. The children looked around to 
see if the policeman was gone, and discovering that he was, commenced to 
play. Plaintiff caught his hand in the moving stairway and was injured so 
badly amputation was necessary. In an action for negligence, held, the plain-
tiff was a trespasser, and the· defendants are not liable. Hardy v. Central 
Londo" Rtiilway Co., [1920] 3 K. B. 459-
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In this case involving the doctrine of. an attractive nuisance, the English 
court distinguishes the leading case of Cooke v. Midland & Gt. Western Ry., 
[I909j A. C. 229, in which an infant was injured by playing on a turntable, 
saying, "ttJere the decision clearly proceeded upon the inference that the 
children resorted to the turntable with the tacit permission of the Railway 
Co.," while in the instant case the children deliberately did what they knew 
they were forbidden to do, and the warnings brought home to them negatived 
the allurement afforded by the moving staircase. The American cases, known 
as the "turntable" cases, I9 L. R A. (N. S.) 1094. Note, do not emphasize 
this distinction, although in Comer v. Winston-Salem, I78 N. C. 383, dis-
cussed in I8 Micii. L. REV. 340, the court held where neighborhood children 
had been accustomed to play near a bridge, it was negligence not to provide 
sufficient protection for children watching the colored water rushing through 
under the bridge. Ever since the first case of this sort, Railroad v. Stout, 
Ii Wall. 657, citing the English case of Lynch v. Nurdin, I Q. B.· 29, IO L. 
]. Q. B. 73, the tendency has been to limit the application of the attractive 
nuisance doctrine. For a complete discussion see 5 MICH. L. REv. 357. It 
would seem as if the English court has worked out a distinction by asking 
whether the child is an invitee by tacit permission, but has not solved the 
difficulty, for 'it is always a question as to just what makes a tacit invitation, 
and one· by no means easy of solution, although this test may be very effective 
in denying any further extension to new sets of facts of the "turntable" 
principle . 
.l:"ARTIES-St:IT BY REPRESENTATIVES OF A CLASS-)URISDIC'l'ION OF FEDERAL 
CouRTs.-Several hundred members of 'the Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur, an 
Indiana fraternal beneficiary society, filed a bill in the United States District 
Court in Indiana, on their own behalf and as representatives of several thou-
sand other 'members of the same class, to enjoin certain uses of trust funds 
held by the society. No Indiana members were individually named as parties. 
A decree was made. The Indiana members of the society subsequently com-
menced actions in the Indiana State courts i~volving ·the same matters de-
cided in the federal case, and the question was presented whether the Indiana 
members were so far parties to the federal suit as to be bound l;>y the federal 
decree and precluded from relitigating in the State courts. Held, on certifi-
cate to the Unite!! States Supreme Court, that all' members of the class, both 
in and out of Indiana, were boun9 by the decree. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur 
v. Cauble, (U. S. Sup. Ct., No. 274), decided March 7, I92I. 
This raises and settles. a very interesting and important question. It was 
considered by the lower federal court that fhe Indiana members could not 
be deemed present in the suit by class representation because their presence 
would oust the court of jurisdiction, since the sole ground of federal juris-
diction was diverse citizenship. 264 Fed. 247. But the .Supreme Court of the 
United States held that class suits were long known to the equit)r practice, 
that such a suit could have been maintained in a State court, that federal 
courts must· he deemed to exercise as broad equity powers as State courts of 
equity, that unless a decree in such a suit would be binding on all ·members, 
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whether resident in the same State as the federal forum or elsewhere, the 
federal courts would be practically excluded from handling important cases 
of this nature, for it would be intolerable to allow parallel class suits to pro-
ceed in State and federal courts for or against differen_t groups of the same 
class. The decision makes the relatiOn between those members of the class 
who are actually present and those who are merely present by representation, 
the same, for jurisdictional purpos~s, as the relation between trustees and. 
beneficiaries, for it always has been held that it is the citizenship of the ad-
ministrator or executor- (Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Bobo, 232 Fed. 7o8), or 
trustee (Johnson v. City of St. Louis, 172 Fed. 31, g6 C. C. A. 617), or re-
ceiver. (Irvine v. ~ankard, 181 Fed. 206), or guardian (Mexican Centro! Ry. 
Co. v. Eckman, 187 U. S. 429), and not the citizenship of the parties bene-
ficially interested, which controls the jurisdiction of the federal court. 
Pum:,1c- SERVICE CoRPORATioNs-FRES Us£ oF GAs :sy· LESSOR-DUTY oF 
EQUAL S£RVIC£.-Plaintiff, a public service corporation, sued to enjoin de-
fendant from interfering with its pipes. Its success depended upon the in-
validity of a covenant in its lease giving the defendant, the lessor, the right 
to supply his residence with gas without charge, by connecting it with plain-
tiff's well. · Plaintiff contended the covenant was ".Oid because in violation of 
a statute requiring public service corporations to serve all on equal term$. 
Held, the effect of the covenant was to give the company the right to devote 
to the public service only so much as remains after the reasonable demands 
of the defendant are satisfied, and the provision of law referred to, is there-
for, not applicable. Pittsburgh & West· Va. Gas Co. v. Nicholsot~, (W. Va., 
1921) 105 S. E. 784. 
Ordinarily under a provisi~n of law requiring public service corporations 
to serve all on equal terms, a· contract to render service in return for any-
thing but a monetary consideration is .invalid. Dorr v. Railroad. Co., 78 W. 
Va. 764; Bell v. Kanawha T. Co., 83 W. Va. 640; Shrader v. Steubenville Co., 
9!) S. E. 2C1Ji City of Charleston v. Public Service Comm., 103 S. E. 673. 
Thus, an agreement by a raih:oad company to issue annual· passes for a period 
of years in return for a grant of land is invalid under such a provision. 
Dorr v. Railroad Co., supra; Bell v. Kanawha .Tr. Co., supra. Also an agree-
ment to do sO: in settlement of a claim for injuries, Louisville & N • .[?.. Co. 
v. Mottley, 219 U. S. 4rl ;. or in return for advertising, State_ v. U. Pac., 87 
Neb. 29; U. S. v. C. I. & l. R." Co., 163 Fed. II4. An agreement to furnish 
free water to 'l'- city in return for the right to lay mains in the streets is like-
wise objectionable under such a provision. Even though such agreements are 
lawful when made, a subsequent law requiring uniformity of rates will in-
validate them, and the clause in the federal constitution forbidding;the states 
t~ pass laws i~piliring'the obligation of contracts affords them no p~tection. 
Raymond Lumber Co. v. Raymond Light & _Water Co., 92 Wash. 330; Hite 
v. C. I. & W. R. Co., 284 Ill. 297. In order to be certain of the uniformity 
which the legislature seeks to secure by such provisions, an unvarying stand-
ard is necessary, and the only feasible one is ·money. If .services and materials 
fumisLed are com~ensated for with· money, the recipients can purchase serv-
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ices on the same basis as others, and equality is assured. Shrader v. Steuben-
ville Co., supra; State v. U. Pac., supra. But 'in the principal case, the court 
holds that where there is a reservation of a portion of the subject-matter by 
the party seeking to compel service, the result is otherwise, and that the effect 
of the arrangement in that case was to reserve such an interest to the lessor. 
Had the agreement been to render the same class of service to the defendant 
as to the rest of the public, the agreement would have been invalid. The gas 
supplied to the owner of the fee, however, never reached the public mains, 
and remained private property .. The theory seems to be that having the right 
to retain the whole, the lessor may retain an undivided interest in such part 
as he chooses. The illustration suggested by the court is not a happy. one. 
It is that of a lessor of a farm, reserving a portion of the crop, and his tenant. 
True, no one would deny the right of the lessor to the.reserved crops. Neither 
could anyone complain if the agreement was that the tenant pay a ·rental and 
sell a portion of the produce to the lessor at a low price. '!'he analogy is 
obviously defective. 
Ri;:wARDs-RrGHT oF >.. SH:eiuFF MAKING J\RRi;:sT ro Cun1 Ri;:wAlll>.-A 
murder had been committed in M county. The sheriff of that county gave 
information· to the sheriff of B county which enabled the latter to find and 
arrest the murderer. There was an equitable proceeding to determine how an 
offered reward should lie distributed. Held, since the sheriff of ll county 
was armed with a warrant, he was charged with the official duty of doing all 
in his power to secure the arrest of the accused and could not, therefore, take 
a r,eward; but the sheriff of B county; having no warrant requiring him to 
apprehend a person charged with a crime in another jurisdiction, was conse-
quently under no -official obligation to arrest or detain the suspect and could 
take a reward. Maggi v. Cassidy, (Ia., l!)ZI) 181 N. W. 2'/. 
Due to the public policy involved the welf settled general rule is that an 
officer eannot receive or recover a reward for doing an act which it is his 
official duty to perform. Marking v. Needy and Hatch, 71 Ky. (8 Bush.) 22. 
The principal case applies this rule. The courts are apparently much influ-
enced by the fact that, generally speaking, a sheriff's ·authority and duty to 
act officially, either within or without his 'jurisdiction, depend on the writ or. 
warrant with which he is armed. Marsh v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 88 
Kan. 538. Since some jurisdictions hold that the powers, duties, and com-
pensation of sheriffs shall be entirely statutory, (M cArlhur v. Boynton, I9. 
Colo. App. 234; Benson v. Smith, 42 Me. 414), reference must be had in a 
particular case· to the statute in force to find out whether the officer who 
claims the reward. was under an ·official duty to act as he did. Of course 
aside from the question of public policy involved, the whole matter rests in 
last analysis on the unquestioned _principle of contract law that merely per· 
forming one's official duty does not constitute sufficient consideration ·for a 
promise. Worthen v. ThQmpson 'i4 Ark. 151. 
TID:SPASS-Lle£NS£-DUTY OF METER R£AD£& 'ro KNOCK Bl!!'OU: EN'J't>RINO 
Dwat.1NG.-D Co. furnished electricity to P under a contract which pro--
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vided that D and its agents should have tree access to the meters and service 
for purposes of examination. X, an employee of D, entered P's house with-
out rapping and without announcing his presence for the purpose of reading 
the meter, and seriously frightened P who was unaware of his entry. Held, 
D, was liable for injury to inmate through fright. Mollinaur v. U11ion Elec-
.tric Co., (Yo., 1921) 2Z7 S. W • .265. 
While the court conceded that the agents of D under the terms of the 
contract had a license, the liability of D was predicated on its. abuse by D's· 
agents, since ordinary· prudence and a wholesome regard for the sanctity of 
the home requires that no entrance be made without announcing one's pres-
ence. In Hitchcock v. Hudson Gas Co., 71 N. J. L. s65, D's agent having 
been refused admittance to remove a meter, subsequently returned and broke 
into P's home, and it was held that D was not liable since be acted under a 
license. But in Reed v. New York Gas Co., 87 N. Y. S. 810, D was held 
liable for breaking into P's cellar in order to remove the meter on the ground 
that, as i!l the principal case, an abuse of a license renders one a trespasser 
ab initio; but the case may be distinguished from the New Jersey decision on 
the ground that it does not appear from the report that the agent had pre-
viously requested admittance. As to whether damages should be recoverable 
when resulting from fright, in an analagous case a trespassing meter reader 
was held to render his master liable for damages resulting froiµ mental 
anguish. Bouillion v. Laclede Gas Co., 148 Mo. App. 462. It would seem 
that where the cause of the mental suffering_ is the trespass on P's prop-
erty, recovery should be allowed. Watson v. Dilts, u6 Ia. 249; 17 MrcH. L. 
Rsv. 40f; 3'4 HARV. L. Rsv. 28o. 
TIUAir-INSTRUCTION TO FIND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY IN A CRIMINAL 
CAss.-Thc :defendant was indicted for selling liquor contrary to the local 
option law. The evidence for· the !.tate was uncontradicted and the judge 
instructed the jury that it was their duty to find the defendant guilty. Held, 
no error. People v. Berridge (1921), 212 Mich. S77· 
It is generally held to be error to direct a verdict of guilty in a criminal 
case under ·any circumstances. I.11cas v. Commonwealth, u8 Ky. 818; Per-
kins v. State, so Ala. 1s4. And there are but few recognized exceptions to 
this rule. In Michigan· a long line of decisions has established the right of 
the court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of guilty in cases where 
no question of intent is involved. People v. Ne11man11, 85 Mich. o8 (selling 
liquor to a minor); People v. Elmer, 109 Mich. 493 (disorderly conduct). 
But the judge cannot discharge the jury and enter a verdict cf guilty, nor 
can he coerce the jury into returning such a verdict. People v. WaN:en, 122 
Mich. So+ Arkansas allows the direction of a verdict of guilty where the 
offense is a mere misdemeanor p_unishable by fine. Stelle v. State, 77 Ark. 
441. As to the rule in the United States courts, see I9 MICH. L. Rsv. 325. 
TRIAir-QUOTIEN'l' Vr:RDICT.-Amount that each juror thought the plain-
tiff should recover was set down and these then added and the average found. 
After a motion made by one juror to make it even money, leaving off $83 and· 
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some odd cents, the sum of $II,700 was adopted as the verdict. There was 
a discussion by the jury as to a quotient verdict's illegality and testimony that 
for this reason the exact amount of quotient was not returned. However, 
there was a disagreement in the evidence, and a conflict in the testimony given 
by the jurors impeaching the verdict as to whether the average was to be 
final and binding or merely for ascertaining a basis for discussion. Held, 
since not dearly shown, the verdict was binding, it was not a quotient verdict 
and was good. Smith v. Hines, (Kans., 1921), 194 Pac. 318. 
A prior Kansas case, Johnson v. Husband, (1879) 22 Kan. z17, held that 
though there was conflict in the testimony of the jurors as to a previous 
binding agreement, since at least four of the jurors believed that the quotient 
finally obtained by such marking, aggregation and division, should be their 
verdict, it should be set aside ?11 proper motion. It is enough to vitiate the 
verdict if the greater number of the jury agreed that the quotient was to be 
binding even though all did not. Sslvester v. Town of Casey (1900), no Ia. 
256. Where all lhe jury make such an agreement the verdict is void. iVerner 
v. EdmistoK (188o), 24 Kan. 147.· Other cases are cited in Ann. Cas. 1917 C 
1224. The verdict is void where all agre~, even though a nominal sum is 
later added without deliberation to make the amount an even number. Ottawa 
''· Gilliland (1901), 63 Kan. 165. Whisenant v. Schawe (Tex., 19n), 141 S. 
W. 146. In the case of Clark v. Ford (1900), IO Kan. App. 579, the court 
decided that a verdict which is more nearly the result of a ~athematical cal-
culation than the deliberate judgment of the jury, cannot stand. But the 
polling of the jury was held to repel any presumption of a quotient verdict, 
though the amount was the same on the second verdict, which the judge had 
caused the jury to bring in after returning to the jury room, because they had 
admitted to him that the first had been arrived at by addition and division. 
Roy v. Goings (1885), 112·m. 656. If after the quotient is obtained and due. 
deliberation it· is returned as a just verdict, it is not legally objectionable. 
Battle Creek v. Haak (1905), 139 Mich. 514 Other cases may be found in 16 
Ann. Cases, 9n. But the court ought not to suggest such a proceeding to 
the jury. Kansas City R.R. Co. v. Ryan (18g2), 49 Kan. 1. The majority of 
courts follow the cases. cited above, that this manner of arriving at the ver· 
diet is in. itself illegal, but it has beeri decided that it does not necessarily 
follow that it must be set aside, and the verciict may be legal as long -as 
moderate in amount and no extravagant abuse is shown. Cleland v. Borough 
of .Carlisle (1898), 186 Pa.·st. no. Cowperthwaite v. Jones (1790), 2 Dau: 
55. I;. would seem that the court in the principal case might well have been 
governed by the previous rulings of the same court in Johnson v. Husband or 
Ottawa v. Gilliland, (supra), but it left the matter of evidence to the trial 
court properly and found that a prior agreement was not shown. It might 
be noted that such a case would not arise in the United States courts, since 
McDonald v. Pless (1915), 238 U. S. 264, which ruled that because of the 
controlling· consideration of public policy, a juror might not impeach his own 
verdict, even though the court found there had actually been a quotient ver-
dict. See Roy v. Goings; (supra), for the same rule, and Flanagan v. Cole-
man ( 1918), 255 Fed. 178. · 
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WILLS-BEQUEST "IN TRUST" CR£AttS ABSOLUTE GIFT.-Testator left 
the residue of his e~tate "in trust" to ·his three executors, directing that they 
should use their best judgment and that they should not be 1·equired to give 
pond. A separate bequest had been made to one of the executors. In a bill 
for the construction of the residuary clause, held, not to create a trust, but 
an absolute gift. Iii re Devers Will. Orr v. Thompson, et al (Wis., I!)2I), 
I8o N. W. 839. 
The language of the will in the instant case more clearly indicates an in-
effective atteplpt to ·create a trust than that of Harvey v. Griggs, III -~ti. 431, 
where a direction· to dispose or' property "according to best judgment'' was 
ht.;ld to create an absolute gift. See note to that case, I9 MICH. L. REV. 455. 
The view that the words "in trust" are not conclusive as to the intention of 
the testator is in accord with Norman v. Prince-, 40 R. I. 402. But see contra, 
Haskell v. Staples, u6 Me. IOJ, where the same language, following a separate 
bequest to the executor, as in the instant case, was held to create a trust 
void for.uncertainty. 
\VILLS-DEC£PTION REGARDING MARRIAGE IS FRAUD WHICH Avoms Ll;GA-
CIES Tultiu;:ny PROCUR£D.-A wife made a residuary bequest to a man whom 
she described as, and· whom she believed to be, her lawful husband. He had 
induced her to enter into the marriage by false representations that he was 
free to marry, whereas in fact he had a wife living from whom he was not 
divorced. In i>roceedings to contest the will, held, that the deception war-
ranted the·inference that the will was the result of the fraud, and that the 
case should not have been taken from the jury. In re Carso~s Estate (Cal., 
I920), I94.Pac. 5. 
The earliest reported case dealing with the question seems to be Ke1usell 
v. Abbott (I799):, 4 Ves. Bo/', in which a legacy to the "husband" of the testa-
trix was held to be avoided by the former's false assumption of that character. 
the existence of which alone in the court's opinion, could be supposed to be 
the motive of the gift. In Wilkinson v. Joughin, L. R. 2 Eq. 319, a bequest 
to the testator's supposed wife was declared void for a similar fraud. In 
Rishton ·v.· Cobb, S Myl. & Cr •. I45. a bequest to a woman "so long as she 
shail .continµe single and unmarried" was held to be valid, even though un-
known to the testator, she was married at the date of- the will, on -the ground 
that there was a. mere inaccuracy in the description of the legatee:. But ·this 
decision was questioned in In re Boddington, 50 L. T: R 701." As pointed 
.out in this case, ·two things must appear: first, a false assumption of th.: char-
acter of the legatee; second, evidence, or a presuinption, that ·the false char-
acter was· the motive for the gift. Thus, if there is no intentional decep-
-tion, the 8if.t ·is valid even though there may be a misdescription. In re Bod-
dington-, supra (where a legacy was given to the wife and later the marriage 
was annulled and· declared void ab imtio due to the impotency of the tes· 
tator); Philip Dries Case, ~ N. ]. Eq. 475 (where the wife did not know 
tliat she was not free to re-marry). See also, Weening v. Temple, 144 Ind. 
i8g. If it appears that-the testator·knows. of the deception, the bequest of the 
legacy is ~alid . .In re Will of Donnely, 68 Iowa 126; Moore v. Heineke, u9 
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Ala. 6z/. Some nice questions may arise as to whether a description enters 
into the essence an~ motive of the gift. In Fanindra Deb Raikat v. Rajiswas 
Dass, L. R. 12 Ind. App. 72, the clause "by virtue of your ·being my adopted 
son"· was held to express the essential motive of the gift, which failed be-
cause the adoption was invalid. But generally a misnomer of a legatee or 
devisee does not invalidate the bequest, if from the witt itself or by extrinsic 
evidence the object of the. testator's bounty can be ascertain.ed. St. Luke's 
Home v. Association, 52 N. Y. 332; Smith v. Kimball, 62 N. H. 6o6. The 
distinction between a description which expresses the motive of the gift and 
shows that it was induced by the character falsely assumed by the beneficiary, 
and a description justifying the conclusion that the gift to the person falsely 
descri~ was induced ·by a desire to benefit the beneficiary personii.tly regard-
less of the. relation, is shown in Wilkinson v. Joughin, supra. There a gift to 
"my wife Adelaide" failed for fraud practised on the testator by Adelaide, 
but a gift to her daughter described as "my stepdaughter Sarah" was good 
as it was shown that the testator did not intend to benefit her personalty. 
